Related papers
The state of the war following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, 13 March 2022
Don Van Atta
Facebook, 2022
Analytical post summarizing what I know as of that date. Originally written for a broad circle of friends.
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The "Big Three" Revisited: Initial Lessons from 200 Days of War in Ukraine
Yagil Henkin
Expeditions with MCUP
This article deals with the tactical lessons of the first six months of the Russian war in Ukraine. The war, which has sent seismic shocks throughout the world, was conceived by many to be a new kind of conflict, with innovative, high-technology weapons and equipment bringing a sea change to the history of warfare. However, a closer look shows a more nuanced picture. While there are many lessons to be learned from this war, it is not as much a break with the past as it is a continuation of it. For all the technology being introduced, not only do tactics remain important, but the war itself is closer in many aspects to the “classic” wars of the twentieth century than to any futuristic concept of warfare.
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One Hundred Days in Ukraine Blitzkrieg, Stalemate, Deadlock
Jahangir Arasli
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Ukraine RU UA WAR in G Engl 230409
Winfried Schneider-Deters
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CfP Soziale Systeme Special Issue The War in Ukraine updated
Chih-Chieh Tang (湯志傑)
CfP Soziale Systeme Special Issue The War in Ukraine updated version 系統理論「戰爭」專號徵稿啟事更新版 New deadline: May 1st 2023 (abstract), September 15th 2023 (text)
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The Limits Of Russian Military Adventurism In The Ukraine
Gary K Busch
At the moment there is a lull in the conflict in Eastern Ukraine as most of the Russian heavy weaponry is being re-deployed into the Mariupol Region and the roving bands of rebels in the east are hunkering down in urban areas rearming and regrouping. This is marginally the result of following the Minsk Agreement but much more importantly, a result of the Russian military’s evaluation of the limits of their own capabilities to sustain the kind and level of warfare they have been conducting in Eastern Ukraine
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The February 2022 Russian Invasion of Ukraine
John Bruni
SAGE International (Adelaide, South Australia), 2022
This Paper looks at how the February 2022 Russian Special Military Operation against Ukraine is Russia's last 'Soviet War'.
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Ukraine's Asymmetric Responses to the Russian Invasion
Nurlan Aliyev
PONARS Eurasia, 2022
For decades, Russian military experts and political elite have suggested that Russia should use asymmetric means and strategies in response to threats and challenges, especially from the West. Moscow now faces asymmetric strategic approaches directed against itself—a first since its own Afghanistan and Chechnya conflicts. Analyzed here are the disproportionate approaches used by Ukraine in the first phase of this year’s war. Although many factors such as Western support have been important for Ukraine’s defense, the tenacity, cohesion, and will of the Ukrainian citizens and soldiers have obstructed the invaders—particularly during the first shocking and precarious days of the heavily lop-sided contest.
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Andrzej Wilk: The best army Ukraine has ever had. Changes in Ukraine's armed forces since the Russian aggression. OSW Studies, No 66, July 2017
Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW)
The annexation of Crimea by Russia and the first weeks of the war in the Donbas revealed what Ukraine’s armed forces were in reality – a petrified structure, incapable of any effective action in the face of minimal enemy engagement. A considerable section of the armed forces’ personnel gradually became aware of whom they were representing only in the course of the conflict and it was not rare that from the perspective of service in one of post-Soviet military districts they sided with Russia. The war in the Donbas shaped the Ukrainian army. It helped its soldiers gain awareness and motivation. It also forced the administration of the Ukrainian ministry of defence and the government to adapt the structure – for the first time since it was formed – to the real operational needs and to incur the costs of preventing a collapse in the area of training and equipment, at least to the level which makes it possible to engage in a war on a level playing field with the pro-Russian separatists.
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DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN AND IBERO-AMERICAN ACADEMY OF YUSTE ABOUT THE WAR IN UKRAINE
Enrique Moradiellos
2023
DECLARATION OF THE EUROPEAN AND IBERO-AMERICAN ACADEMY OF YUSTE ABOUT THE WAR IN UKRAINE, 23 February 2023. NEWSLETTER OF THE ACADEMY OF YUSTE Nº 24. February 2023
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